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Abstract—Device fingerprinting over the web has received
much attention both by the research community and the com-
mercial market a like. Almost all the fingerprinting features
proposed to date depend on software run on the device. All
of these features can be changed by the user, thereby thwarting
the device’s fingerprint. In this position paper we argue that the
recent emergence of the HTML5 standard gives rise to a new
class of fingerprinting features that are based on the hardware
of the device. Such features are much harder to mask or change
thus provide a higher degree of confidence in the fingerprint. We
propose several possible fingerprint methods that allow a HTML5
web application to identify a device’s hardware. We also present
an initial experiment to fingerprint a device’s GPU.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identifying a user – without its explicit cooperation – as
it browses the web is a much coveted goal of the websites
the user visits. Identifying a visiting user allows a website to
combat fraud and detect breaches of the website’s terms of use.
On the flip side it can be used to compromise the privacy of a
user by tracking him and identifying his browsing habits and
history. This is most commonly used to serve advertisements
tailored to the user. In most cases, identifying a user without
his cooperation is reduced to identifying the device it uses to
browse the web. The most straightforward method to track a
device is by using HTTP cookies. This allows a web site to
store state on the user’s device, which is then sent back to the
website upon subsequent visits.
In the last few years more and more cases were observed
in which HTTP cookies were abused to track a user and his
browsing history [1]. This has heightened the user community
awareness of the privacy threats imposed by HTTP cookies.
A recent study [2] in Australia has shown that 1/3 of users
delete cookies within a month after their visit to a website. In
addition, there are numerous plug-ins and browser extensions
that allow a user to keep tabs on the cookies set on his device
(e.g. [3]). Moreover, most browsers allow to block third-party
cookies (cookies that are set by a website not listed in the
address bar, usually advertisements embedded on the primary
website) [4], [5].
This general unavailability of cookies motivated advertisers
and trackers to find new ways to track users and their browsing
histories. Today, there is a number of commercial companies
that provide “cookieless” device identification through web-
based fingerprinting [1]. In addition, there are numerous
research works [6]–[8] that show that a device can be finger-
printed based on the browser and operating system features.
The most notable features include plugin enumeration, enabled
browser features, User-Agent HTTP header, font detection,
Windows registry values, screen resolution and driver enu-
meration. For a comprehensive survey of the features used
to fingerprint a device see [1]. All these features are solely
software-based, namely they are features that can be set or
changed using software only. As such they can be readily
changed by the user. For example, by simply changing the
browser used to access a website a user can foil many of
these fingerprinting features.
In this position paper we argue that the recent emergence
of the HTML5 standard [9] gives rise to a new class of
fingerprinting features that are based on the hardware of the
device and are not necessarily dependent on the software
installed on the device. Such features are much harder to foil
as long as the user uses the same device, hence they provide a
stronger degree of confidence in the device fingerprint. These
hardware features may be classified into two subclasses:
1) Explicit – these features are based on standard well-
defined characteristics of the hardware usually deter-
mined explicitly by the manufacturer; most commonly,
they allow to differentiate between different models or
versions of the hardware module installed on the device.
For example, the clock frequency of a GPU installed on
the device is a standard explicitly designed characteristic
of the model or version of the GPU.
2) Implicit – these features are derived from slight incon-
sistencies in the manufacturing process of the hardware
module; they allow to differentiate between different
instances of hardware having the same model or version.
For example, the clock skew of a GPU is different for
every GPU instance even those that have the same clock
frequency and model.
HTML5 offers a wealth of new features and capabilities
to create more sophisticated and engaging web applications
running over a browser. To allow these new features and
capabilities the browser inevitably allows the web application
a wider and more permissive access to the device’s resources.
In particular, HTML5 exposes high level JavaScript APIs that
sit on top of the system’s underlying hardware capabilities
without the need to install third party plugins. This more
permissive access to the device’s hardware may allow a
website to fingerprint a device based on its hardware features.
Although very few works address hardware fingerprinting
using HTML5, there are strong indications that suggests that
this is feasible.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section II we
review related work on device fingerprinting over the web.
In Section III we introduce several possible hardware-based
fingerprinting methods which may be used over the web.
In Section IV we present results of initial experiments we
conducted to fingerprint a device based on its GPU features.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There are many works that explore methods to fingerprint a
web client. As noted above, the vast majority of these works
propose fingerprinting methods that are based on software-
related features, primarily those of the browser, operating
system, and drivers. Ref. [7] showed that parameters of system
configuration such as screen resolution, browser plugins and
system fonts as well as the contents of HTTP headers –
User-Agent and Accept – allow to fingerprint a device. Other
works proposed more fingerprinting methods that rely on other
browser features, such as history and file cache [10], JavaScript
performance [11], and deviations from JavaScript conformance
tests [12].
Additionally, in the past several years it has been shown [13]
that many web sites identify a web client based on “super-
cookies”. These are identifiers which are stored on the local
host in various persistent ways outside the control of a browser,
hence the browser can not impose standard restriction on their
use as on HTTP cookies. This is also a software-based method.
To the best of our knowledge there are only two works that
aim to fingerprint a web client based on its hardware features.
Ref. [14] proposed the use of rendering text and WebGL
scenes to a HTML5 <canvas> element while measuring the
resulting pixel map of the canvas. Different browsers display
text and graphics in a different way. The difference stems
from a mix of software – browser and driver – and hardware
– GPU – configurations. The proposed method does not
intend to differentiate between two web clients with the exact
same software and hardware configuration, i.e, using implicit
hardware features.
Ref. [15] is the only work we are aware of that aim
to differentiate between two web client based on implicit
hardware features. The proposed approach is to measure the
web client’s CPU clock skew. The measurements are done
using a JavaScript code that periodically sends timestamps
back to the server. This work was inspired by [16] which
showed that a device’s clock skew can fingerprint a device.
III. HARDWARE ACCESS USING HTML5
In the following we list the hardware modules a web page
may have direct to indirect access to using HTML5. For each
device we reference the API documentation used to access that
hardware module. And for each device we propose possible
directions for a fingerprinting method.
a) GPU [17]: All modern browser are now “hardware-
accelerated”, meaning that rendering graphics may be done
using the device’s GPU. The rendering latency of various
graphics may be used to fingerprint a GPU’s clock frequency
and skew. In the next section we describe our initial experi-
ments using this fingerprint method.
b) Camera [18]: A website may be able, by user permis-
sion, to capture a picture or a video using a camera. It has been
shown in [19] that each pixel of a camera’s optical sensor has
a small but measurable bias. This bias is a linear function of
the actual intensity of light hitting the pixel1. There are a few
works that deal with camera identification using the pixels’
bias. Ref. [20] proposes a method to determine a camera’s
reference bias using 300 pictures taken by that camera. This
serves as a unique fingerprint for the camera. It is shown that
this enables to associate with good probability a new picture
with the camera that took it.
c) Speakers/Microphone [21]: The main specification of
a microphone and speakers is the frequency response graph.
A microphone’s frequency response is its normalized output
gain over a given frequency range. Conversely, a speaker’s
frequency response is its normalized output audio intensity
over a given frequency range. A typical microphone or speaker
has a response curve that varies across different frequencies.
These variations are dependent on the design of the audio
device. Moreover, due to manufacturing inconsistencies the
frequency responses of each instance of a microphone or a
speaker are not identical even if they are of the same model. A
device’s response for each frequency has a tolerance relative to
the response specified by the manufacturer. A typical tolerance
for commodity microphone and speakers is ±2db. It has
been suggested in [22] that such variances in the frequency
responses are able to fingerprint a mobile device. A web
page can play tones in certain frequencies using the device’s
speakers while at the same time record the played audio using
the microphone. This allows the web page to measure the
frequency responses of the speakers and microphones. Such a
method can also be applicable to desktop computers.
d) Motion sensors [23]: Many mobile devices are
equipped with accelerometer and gyroscope. Both sensors
have linear biases, i.e. vm = vtS + O. Here vm and vt
denote the measured and true values, respectively, while S
and O are the sensitivity and offset of the sensor. Ideally,
the parameters’ values should be S = 1 and O = 0. For each
sensor instance the bias may be different due to manufacturing
differences. Moreover, other imperfections, aside form the
offset and sensitivity, may be created due to inconsistencies
in the manufacturing process. A web page can read measure-
ments from these sensors, thereby potentially calculate their
imperfections. Ref. [22] and [24] suggest that such a feat is
indeed possible.
e) GPS [25]: A GPS receiver triangulates the location of
a device by calculating its distance to at least 3 GPS satellites.
The distances are calculated by measuring the time a signal
travels from a satellite to the GPS receiver. The travel time is
measured using an inaccurate clock built into the GPS receiver.
Previous work [16] has shown that a clock’s skew can identify
the clock. However, modern GPS receivers utilize a 4th satellite
measurement which allows to cancel out the bias. Therefore,
theoretically, the clock’s bias does not affect the calculated
1This linear bias is commonly called pattern noise.
location. Nonetheless, there are still many sources of errors
while calculating the receiver’s position, such as atmospheric
effects and multi-path effects. Such errors are not taken into
account during the position determination and are implicitly
treated as error sourced by the clock bias. Therefore, this
may lead to a position calculation where the clock bias is
no perfectly corrected. We hypothesize that taking multiple
location measurements from the GPS might expose this bias.
f) Battery [26]: As time goes by the battery wears out
and its capacity degrades. The rate at which this happens
depends on many factors, such as climate, usage and charging
patterns [27]. The lose of capacity affects how fast a battery
can be charged or discharged. Therefore, every device has a
charging/discharging rate which is unique to it. A website can
pole the battery status of a device (i.e. smartphone, tablet or
laptop). Poling the battery allows to estimate the exact charg-
ing and discharging rate of a battery thereby fingerprinting
the device. Of course, the charging/discharging rate is not
dependent only on the battery capacity but also on the current
activities performance on the device and the process that are
currently running on it. A successful fingerprinting method
would need to find a way to take away these factors.
IV. FINGERPRINTING USING THE GPU
In the following we present our initial efforts to fingerprint
a device using its GPU. Although the results are encouraging,
we do not aim to present here a complete GPU fingerprint
method, but rather to present indications that such a method
is possible. We aim to fingerprint the GPU based on an explicit
feature – the GPU clock frequency – and based on an implicit
feature – the GPU clock skew. The latter feature is inspired
by the clock skew method presented in [16]. In this work
a computer was fingerprinting using its CPU clock skew. In
this method many timestamped packets were sent periodically
by the device. Another computer picked up this packets and
calculated the first computer’s CPU’s skew. More accurately,
this method measured the first computer’s CPU’s skew relative
to the CPU’s skew of the second one. As one might expect, the
network jitter between the two computers have a significant
effect on the skew measurements. In order to average out
this jitter many timestamped packet must by sent, thereby
prolonging the fingerprint process. Nonetheless, sending the
timestamps to another computer is crucial to this fingerprinting
method since one can not measure the skew of a clock without
another reference clock.
The basic idea of our fingerprinting method is simple.
We leverage HTML5 in order to use the device’s CPU as
a reference clock while measuring the device’s GPU clock
skew. Namely, we strive to fingerprint a device by measuring
the relative clock skews of the device’s CPU and GPU.
Unfortunately, unlike the CPU, there is no JavaScript API to
get a timestamp of the GPU clock. Therefore, we have to resort
to indirect methods in order to measure the GPU’s clock skew.
The fingerprinting method we employ is straightforward.
We render using WebGL [28] complex 3D scenes on an
HTML5 canvas. We measure how many frames are rendered
on the screen within a predefined time interval. This measure-
ments forms the basis for the GPU fingerprint. Assuming our
fingerprint test is the only process that occupies the GPU then
the number of rendered frames is largely dependent on explicit
features of the GPU, e.g the clock frequency, number of cores
and other parameters that affect the GPU’s performance. Note,
however, that the software that allows access to the GPU –
i.e. browser and GPU driver – also influences to some extent
the GPU performance. The number of rendered frames are
also affected, to a much lesser extent, by the clock skew of
the GPU. Note that time interval within which the frames are
rendered is measured using the CPU’s clock.
Since the rate of rendered frames per second has a maximum
value of 60 (this in the common refresh rate of computer
displays), one must render complex graphics which strain the
GPU so the frame rate will not reach this bound, thereby
probing the GPU limits.
A. Experiment
In our experiment we crafted a website that displays 3D
graphics in three phases. Each phase displayed increasingly
complex graphics. Where each phase lasted 15 seconds. within
which we measured the number of rendered frames in three
5-seconds intervals. The rendering process was performed
using the requestAnimationFrame() API. This API signals
the browser that the animation procedure should be called
before the next refresh of the device’s display. The ani-
mation procedure itself calls this API so it shall be in-
voked regularly. The experiment website can be found here:
http://fingerprintme.herobo.com. We calculate the average of
the 3 measurements of each phase. Thereby getting a finger-
print per phase for each device. We fingerprinted 130 different
devices; 34 of which were fingerprinted more than once. To
simplify the analysis we confined our experiment only to
desktop and laptop computers.
B. Results
We first measured for each computer and each phase the 95th
percentile of the difference between every two measurements
(i.e. the number of rendered frames per 5 seconds). We used
the 95th percentile rather than the maximum difference to
disregard any outliers which are most notably caused by
the browser window leaving focus and not showing on the
screen2. The 95th percentile difference was calculated to be
5 frames. We then plotted for each phase a histogram of the
phase’s measurements with bins having width of 5 frames.
The histograms are depicted in Figure 1. The entropy of the
fingerprint distribution for each phase can be found in Table I.
It is evident from both Figure 1 and Table I that as the
rendered graphics are more complex the fingerprint allows
to better differentiate between different computers. The most
complex phase is able to yield fingerprint entropy of 5.14
bits. We suspect that even more complex graphics would yield
higher entropy.
2In such cases the browser automatically reduces the maximum number of
rendered frames per second.
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(a) phase I results (least complex graphics)
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(b) phase II results (medium complexity graphics)
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(c) phase III results (most complex graphics)
Fig. 1. Distribution of number of rendered frames
Phase I Phase II Phase III
2.8 5.03 5.14
TABLE I
THE ENTROPY OF THE FINGERPRINT FOR EACH PHASE [BITS]
200 236 234
249 177 195
182 190 232
TABLE II
FINGERPRINT VALUE MEASURED DURING PHASE III FOR 9 DIFFERENT
COMPUTERS HAVING THE SAME HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE
SPECIFICATION
Note that this initial experiment actually measures the
performance of the GPU. As noted above, although the most
influential features of this performance is the hardware features
of the GPU. The efficiency of the software that uses the
GPU (browser and GPU driver) also affect its performance.
Therefore, more sophisticated fingerprint tests may be needed
to weed out the software influence.
We also run the fingerprint test on 9 desktop computers
having the same hardware and software configuration3.The
results of the fingerprints are in Table II. The fingerprint was
consistent across multiple experiments for each computer. The
results give encouraging indication that a GPU fingerprint may
allow to differentiate even computers with the same hardware
and software configurations. The differences in fingerprints
were actually wider than we initially expected. It seems that
more factors, other than the GPU clock skew, differ between
GPUs of the same model. A successful fingerprinting method
would need to take this into account.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we point out the possibility that the recent
emergence of HTML5 enable a new class of powerful fin-
gerprinting features that are based on the characteristics of
the hardware of the device rather than on the software it
runs. Such hardware features allow not only to differentiate
between devices with different hardware configurations, but
3computer model: HPZ220, graphics card: Nvidia Quadro 600, OS: Win-
dows 7 SP1, Browser: Firefox.
also can potentially differentiate between devices having the
same exact hardware configuration. We introduce some ideas
for hardware fingerprinting. And present encouraging results
of an initial experiment to fingerprint a device using its GPU.
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